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Introductory remarks
Whenever we type the word „corruption” in any of the internet-based search programs, it
gives nearly 20 million results,  and the fact is,  that  hundreds of international  conferences
focus on the so-called “today’s plague” phenomenon every year.
Nowadays it is hard to say anything new about one of our greatest common enemy to date,
that spreads across the globe, corruption.
The  roots  of  abuse  and  misuse  carried  out  to  reach  individual  goals,  backed  by  rights
delegated by the community1, date back to thousands of years.
To enumerate forms of corruption really takes a man, yet let’s recall the classic example, how
Paris  designated  to  choose  the  most  beautiful  of  all  goddess  in  Greek  mythology  was
approached by different offers: it was probably Zeus’s wife who committed the presently most
typical version of corruption, offering richness. The career opportunity promised by Pallas
Athene on the other hand, also holds a good value even today.2 
In addition, as far as we know, the enemy could pass the impenetrable Great Wall of China for
centuries only by corrupting the guards.
Over the years, the situation did not improve too much.
Some International Instruments
In the last 20 years a considerable number of international instruments was adopted to oblige
states to criminalise certain forms of corruptive behaviour.
1 See in details: Endre BÓCZ: The Corruption in Hungarian Criminal Law. (In: Papers on the Corruption. 
Helikon/Korridor, Budapest, 1998)
2 See János BÁNÁTI: Address of the President of the Budapest Bar Association (In: Young Penalist Conference 
on Corruption and Related Ofeences in International Business Relations. HAS  Working Papers, No18. 
Budapest, 2003.p.10.)
The most important of these are the following:
- Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ financial
interests (27 September 1996);
- Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K 3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European
Union on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities
of officials of Member States of the European Union (26 May 1997);
- Joint Action of 22 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3
of the Treaty on European Union, on corruption in the private sector;
- Criminal  Law  Convention  on  Corruption  (adopted  on  27  November  1999  in  the
framework of Council of Europe);
- United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;
- Resolution (99) 5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe: Agreement 
      Establishing the Group of States against Corruption;
        -    Resolution (97) 24 of the Committee of Members of the Council of Europe: Twenty 
             Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption; 
        -    OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
              Business Transactions;
- The Reports on Group of States against Corruption (GRECO - 1999);
- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the European Economic and Social Committee of 6 June 2011 – Fighting corruption in
the EU [COM (2011) 308] 
Global Corruption Barometer of Transparency International - 2013
The recently published Global Report of Transparency International gives special actuality to 
the abovementioned statement. According to the Report of 2013, which released some echoes 
in Hungary, our country had fallen back by one place on the ranking list.
“It  seems as though Hungarian society is  becoming insensitive  to corruption.  70% of the
population would not report corruption either because they do not trust authorities or they are
afraid of repercussions. Mistrust penetrates public life more than ever, which is the hotbed for
sidestepping  rules,  corruption  and  apathy.   According  to  Transparency  International,  the
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government does not encourage citizens to stand up against corruption, as it does not provide
adequate protection for whistleblowers, nor does it enforce the fast and effective investigation
of announcements of corruption.” 3  
With a view to those present, here I have to emphasize that the above generalization did not
concern the judicial system, and Hungarian public opinion considers the judicial system as the
least corrupt.
Let’s take a more pragmatic look at the phenomenon: the corruption index in every country
shows close relation to its GDP per capita. 
If the corruption index improves by 1 point a(n) 0.3 percent increase in the GDP is likely to
occur.  (Hungary  presently  having  54),  This  is  one  good  reason  why it  is  worth  fighting
corruption.
A few words about the past and present  in Hungary
Those earlier expectations, that did seek more effective actions against corruption from the
use of more strict and rigorous tools of criminal law, or from fighting back the latent and
undetectable crimes, or simply from the improvement of detection, were not met. 
Corruption was related to the economic deficit in the last decades of the previous century, and
it was made an ordinary, routine act, by the fact that some material goods were available only
through  offering  and  accepting  illegitimate  benefits.  Before  the  transition  of  the  market
economy, a different type of corruption existed, which was harder to detect but was more
widespread, the so-called exchange of symbolic goods (such as relations, connections, and
positions)  were  exchanged  for  mutual  benefits.  Some  people  hoped  that  this  form  of
protectionism could  be  de-emphasized  by  the  re-establishment  and  transformation  of  the
economy and economic conditions. Unfortunately, the forms of corruption, even with the re-
establishment  and  transformation  of  the  political  and  economic  conditions,  could  not  be
eliminated, and could only adjust to these new conditions.  The process of privatization in
Hungary – especially its earlier stage – was infected by different forms of corruption.  The
politically determined legislation,  and its weaknesses empowered the possibilities of abuse
3 In 2013 Hungary scored 54 points in the CPI survey, thus ranking 47th out of the 177 surveyed countries. 
Among the European Union’s 28 member states, Hungary ranked 20th (last year 19th out of 27 member states); 
therefore, its ranking remains unchanged in the bottom third. In regional comparison, Hungary is in the mid-
range, following Estonia, Poland, Lithuania and Slovenia. 
(http://www.transparency.hu/HUNGARY_IS_CORRUPT___AND_IT_IS_NOT_THE_ONLY_ONE?
bind_info=page&bind_id=322 – 10.04.2014.)
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and misuse, and by the time the correct legal frames for the privatization were created, major
part of the transition had already taken place.
Therefore we can see that corruption can not be eliminated in the foreseeable future. Even
with the lack of economic constraints  and pressure,  the need for bribery still  regenerates.
Nowadays the interrelationship between power and corruption, the approach and the trade of
the political influence appear as dominant as ever. The corrupt relations are intensifying on
international level as well. Therefore we must pay attention to the new forms of corruption,
that sometimes hide the usual basis of the act more, and therefore we must identify and handle
these acts according to their severity, in order to develop effective countermeasures. And the
dedication and determination of this strife shall be clear despite temporary setbacks.
The regulatory system of the Hungarian Criminal Law
Now let’s look at how the Hungarian Criminal Law aims at fighting against corruption.
In the last 150 years four penal codes were enacted in Hungary. During the time of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy the Penal Code of 1878 was enacted (which, naturally, was in force only
in the territory of the historical Hungary and it was not valid for the territory of the Austrian
Empire; the second one was enacted in 1961, the third in 1978 and the present in 2012.
Chapter XXVII of the recent Hungarian Criminal Code enumerates 9 corruption offences.
- Active Corruption in Economy
- Passive Corruption in Economy 
- Active Corruption in Public Officials
- Passive Corruption in Public Officials
- Active Corruption in Court or Regulatory Proceedings
- Passive Corruption in Court or Regulatory Proceedings
- Misprision of Bribery
- Indirect Corruption
- Abuse of a Function
The  regulation  –  that  equally  administers  the  domestic  and  international  levels  –  is  in
accordance with the European standards.  All forms of the passive corruption in economy and
in public officials should it be either(request or acceptance of benefits) are punishable, in most
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severe cases – if there is a concrete misconduct or breach of obligation related to the act – the
punishment can add up to 10 years of imprisonment.
The active corruption in public officials  (such as providing or promising benefits)  is also
punishable, but in the economic sphere it is only punishable if it leads to misconduct or breach
of obligation. Therefore according to the Hungarian criminal law, in the economic sphere the
benefits given or promised for fulfilling obligations without leading to misconduct or breach
of obligation,  is  not criminal  corruption (but  requesting or accepting  is  a type  of passive
corruption.).
Here is the regulation of the most important forms of passive and active corruption4:
Active Corruption
Section 290
Passive Corruption
Section 291
(1)  Any  person  who  gives  or  promises
unlawful advantage to a person working for
or on behalf of an economic operator, or to
another person on account of such employee,
to induce him to breach his duties is guilty of
a  felony  punishable  by  imprisonment  not
exceeding three years.
(2)  The  penalty  shall  be  imprisonment
between  one  to  five  years  if  the  criminal
offense  described  in  Subsection  (1)  is
committed  in  connection  with  a  person
working  for  or  on  behalf  of  an  economic
operator who is authorized to act in its name
and on its behalf independently.
(3) The penalty shall be:
a) imprisonment between one to five years
in the case under Subsection (1);
b) imprisonment  between  two  to  eight
years in the case under Subsection (2);
if  the  crime  of  corruption  is  committed  in
criminal association with accomplices or on
a commercial scale.
(4)  Any  person  who  commits  the  act  of
corruption  in  connection  with  a  person
working  for  or  on  behalf  of  a  foreign
economic  operator  shall  be  punishable  in
accordance with Subsections (1)-(3).
(1) Any person who requests or receives an
unlawful  advantage  in  connection  with  his
activities  performed for  or  on behalf  of  an
economic operator, for himself or for a third
party,  or  accepts  a  promise  of  such  an
advantage,  or  is  in  league with  the person
requesting or accepting the advantage for a
third party on his behest, is guilty of a felony
punishable  by  imprisonment  not  exceeding
three years.
(2) If the perpetrator:
a) breaches  his  official  duty  in  exchange
for unlawful advantage he is punishable by
imprisonment between one to five years,
b) commits the criminal offense defined in
Subsection  (1)  in  criminal  association  with
accomplices or on a commercial scale he is
punishable by imprisonment between two to
eight years.
(3) If the perpetrator is working for or on
behalf  of  an  economic  operator  who  is
authorized  to  act  in  its  name  and  on  its
behalf  independently,  the  penalty  shall  be
imprisonment:
a) between one  to  five  years  in  the  case
under Subsection (1);
b) between two to eight years in the case
4 Act. C. of 2012. on the Hungarian Criminal Code
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(5) The penalty may be reduced without 
limitation - or dismissed in cases deserving 
special consideration - against the 
perpetrator of a criminal offense defined in 
Subsection (1) if he confesses the act to the 
authorities first hand and unveils the 
circumstances of the criminal
under Paragraph a) of Subsection (2);
c) between  five  to  ten  years  in  the  case
under Paragraph b) of Subsection (2).
(4) Any person working for or on behalf of
a  foreign  economic  operator  shall  be
punishable  in  accordance  with  Subsections
(1)-(3)  for  the  commission  of  the  criminal
offense defined therein.
(5)  The  penalty  may  be  reduced  without
limitation - or dismissed in cases deserving
special  consideration  -  against  the
perpetrator of a criminal offense defined in
Subsection (1) if he confesses the act to the
authorities  first  hand,  surrenders  the
obtained unlawful financial advantage in any
form  to  the  authorities,  and  unveils  the
circumstances of the criminal act.
Passive Corruption in public Officials
Section 294
Active Corruption in Public Officials
Section 293
 (1)  Any  public  official  who  requests  or
receives  an  unlawful  advantage  in
connection  with  his  actions  in  an  official
capacity, for himself or for a third party, or
accepts a promise of such an advantage, or
is  in  league  with  the  person requesting  or
accepting the advantage for a third party on
his behest, is guilty of a felony punishable by
imprisonment between one to five years.
(2)  The  penalty  shall  be  imprisonment
between  two  to  eight  years  if  the  criminal
offense  is  committed  by  a  high-ranking
public official.
 (1)  Any person who attempts to bribe a
public  official  by  giving  or  promising
unlawful  advantage  to  such  person  or  to
another person for influencing such official’s
actions in an official capacity is guilty of a
felony  punishable  by  imprisonment  not
exceeding three years.
(2)  Any  person  committing  bribery  is
punishable by imprisonment between one to
five  years  if  he  gives  or  promises  the
advantage to a public official to induce him
to  breach  his  official  duty,  exceed  his
competence or otherwise abuse his position
of authority.
The new regulation that has been in effect for almost a year, is stricter than its predecessor
which gave bigger freedom to passive economic parties  unauthorized to take independent
measures.
Opportunities and hopes for improvement
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In the following, I would like to list those legislative tasks that are said to weaken the basis of
corruption. I would like to start with what is always on the agenda, however, in my opinion it
is not an appropriate, adequate tool.
In  today’s  world,  that  urges  for  severity,  the  penalties  related  to  corruption  are  often
considered for further severity. Of course this is merely a question of willingness. Although
the experience is that the idea of introducing more severe penalties only serves the prevention
indirectly and to an uncertain extent.
Therefore – the increase of penalties could express and reflect the dedicated strife against
criminal corruption. I think, that the real solution nowadays should not be the supervision of
sanctions.  The  lack  of  severity  has  never  been  the  reason,  not  even  indirectly,  for  these
criminal acts.
Simirarly it seems that the possibility to evade the punishment in case of repentance did not
live up to the expectations as well.
I  do  not  consider  the  continuous  establishment  of  new  “independent  anti-corruption
syndicates”, boards, or committees to be an effective method, as these will always remain to
be mere formal actions. Finally, I consider that  the idea of paying part of the bribery sum to
the denunciator as a reward as a false attempt. Corruption is an intimate criminal act, in most
cases  only  the  involved  parties  know  about  it,  and  the  suspiciousness,  accusation,  or
denunciation without the needed information is a double edges sword, that could lead to false
accusations, which can seriously and ultimately damage the righteous human relations.
The supervision of measures providing the opportunity for corruption
What is it that gives us hope for success? Well, I think, that first and foremost the continuous
and thorough supervision of legal norms related situations those have a potential to corrupt
relationships. – could be such a method. It shall not discourage us that Hungary has numerous
such measures situations to superwise. In this matter, criminalists, criminologists, or even law
enforcers and executors shall establish a continuous, consultative co-operation primarily with
the professionals from the fields of business law and administrative law.
It  might  be  surprising,  but  I  also  consider  that  if  these  goals  can  only  be  realized  by
establishing a more complex and complicated bureaucracy, then we shall accept this price.
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It seems, that we cannot use a more effective and direct weapon against criminal corruption
than bureaucracy and the multistage proceedings supported by several steps of supervision
and  filtering.  Of  course  the  emphasis  is  not  on  the  complexity  and  the  time-consuming
characteristics of it, but rather on implementing the mutual and continuous control.5  
To conclude, I would add one more comment.
We shall not deny the attitude-forming effects of ethical norms, and righteousness. 
I am well aware of the fact, that this requirement is so obvious, on the other hand it is slightly
naïve, that it is also naive, and lacks from reality.  Nowadays it is not easy to expect that
today’s harsh and violent money-seeking attitude, the publicity of ultimate self-interest, or the
unscrupulous fight for better  market positions could be restrained and subdued or even be
formed by ethical remonstrance.   On the long run however, we should not forget these Ideas. 
We must  believe  that  sooner  or  later  the  exemplary  and  educative  role  of  morals  will
inevitably provide aid in the fight against corruption.
Even if we do not make it to see it happen, the future still depends on what we leave to our
successors.
5 The European Commission has acknowledged “ambitious” policies in Hungary to fight corruption, but added 
that financing of political parties, control mechanisms for public procurement procedures and conflicts of interest
among public officials remain issues of concern.
The EU anti-corruption report  […] said Hungary should do more to strengthen accountability standards for
elected and appointed officials,  deal  with risks concerning favouritism in public  administration and to
progressively eliminate  the practice  of  gratuity payments  in  health  care.  (EC concerned  over  political
financing, corruption in Hungary - http://www.politics.hu/20140204/ec-concerned-over-political-financing-
corruption-in-hungary/ - 10.04.2014.)
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